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Unreviewability of General Counsel's
Discretion: Proposed Amendments
for a Private Cause of Action
for Unfair Labor Practices
I. Introduction
The victim of an unfair labor practice, as defined by the National
Labor Relations Act ' (NLRA), would at first glance appear to have
several avenues for obtaining relief. He might process his claim through
either the state or federal courts or the National Labor Relations Board.
2
The success of a court action, however, depends on whether the claim fits
into an exception carved out of the NLRB's broad jurisdiction over the
labor field. 3 If it is not within one of the exceptions, the case is dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. In all cases, the injured party may apply directly
to the General Counsel and request that he prosecute the claim before the
NLRB. The General Counsel is not required to adjudicate all claims,
however. In fact, he advises withdrawal or dismisses seventy percent of
the charges filed. 4 By judicial interpretation of the NLRA, a decision by
the General Counsel to dismiss is not subject to review. 5 Thus, in
situations in which the injured party has no independent right to proceed
through the courts and the General Counsel declines to prosecute, an
individual has no opportunity to present his claim.
General Counsel's absolute authority has been criticized by Con-
gressmen, 6 commentators, 7 employees, labor, and management 8 because
I. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
2. This comment deals exclusively with the remedies available under the federal
labor laws. Pennsylvania state remedies are beyond the scope of this comment.
3. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text infra.
4. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 11 (1975). In fiscal year 1975, 35.5% of the charges were
withdrawn before complaint and 35.5% were dismissed. Id.
5. NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957).
6. In a recent statement Congressman John Erlenborn noted that he would be
satisfied if Congress did no more than "reform the General Counsel's unreviewable discre-
tion to issue a complaint. He is unique in our jurisprudence; being vested, as he is, with
authority to decide whether a complaining party will get his day in court." Address by
Congressman Erlenborn, 1974 ABA Conference on Labor Relations, ABA 1974 PROGRAM
AND PROCEEDINGS OF LAB. REL. LAW REP. 218,225.
7. Bartosic, Labor Law Reform-The NLRB and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L. REv. 647
(1970); Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law--Concerning a
Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471
(1972). See note 197 infra.
8. Testifying before a congressional committee, Charles Loomis, an employee active
in union organization, stated that he was fired for failure to report for work after being
rescheduled without notification. After a hearing no action was taken. In a letter to the
of the unpredictability of its application and potential for abuse. One
solution to the problem caused by judicial abstention is the express
provision for an individual right of action to vindicate private rights. The
House has recently rejected an amendment designed to correct the prob-
lem through expansion of the right to proceed without representation by
the General Counsel. 9 This comment will explore the rationale of the
policy of unreviewability and the arguments for change. A brief survey is
included of other federal agencies that recognize private actions, and the
two legislative proposals will be analyzed to determine how they will
remedy the problem.
I1. Background
A. History and Procedure of the Office of the General Counsel
The Office of the General Counsel is one product of the legislative
reforms of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Bill. 10 Prior to 1947 the NLRB was
responsible for initiating, investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating
unfair labor practice violations." To achieve a separation of powers, the
legislature created the position of General Counsel, with "final authority,
on behalf of the Board" to investigate and issue complaints and to
prosecute those complaints before the Board. ' 2 The main headquarters of
the Office are in Washington, D.C. and there are thirty-one regional
Regional Director, Loomis described his inability to obtain employment, meet his bills, or
retain his home. He expressed outrage that almost seven months later, despite several
allegations of union-motivated firings, "statements from management officials regarding
[the] program to get rid of certain people and [his] testimony, . . . to this date they have not
issued a complaint, scheduled a hearing, or done anything." Oversight Hearings on the
NLRB, H.R. 8110 etc., Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgt. Rel. of the House Co. on
Education and Labor, 94th Cong., I st Sess. 337-38 (1976) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings
on NLRB]; McConville, NLRB Down South-How 7,041 Got Fired, THE NATION, Oct. 25,
1975, at 392-94.
Unions also express dissatisfaction with the process. Roland Davis who represents the
Retail Clerks Union stated that
The importance of the decision to issue complaints cannot be over-
stated. . . If the General Counsel refuses to issue complaint on a meritorious
case, there is absolutely no relief that a union can obtain. . . . There must be
some way to permit charging parties to have a more effective appeal than appeal
to the General Counsel's office when the Gen. Counsel's office sustains the
Regional Office in over ninety percent of the cases.
Oversight Hearings on NLRB, supra at 317-18.
Employers are also pushing for reforms.
A poll taken among chamber of commerce and trade associations . . . gave
top priority to the proposal to strip the NLRB of power to rule when an employer
has committed an unfair labor practice as defined in the labor law.
Some 28 per cent of the votes put that change in the No. I position.
How Business Hopes to Change the Nation's Labor Laws, 66 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 16, 1969, at 68-69.
9. See notes 156-93 and accompanying text infra.
10. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.
1960), for a detailed history of the establishment of the Office of the General Counsel.
1I. Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951); accord, NLRB v.
Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.07 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS (1958 Treatise)].
12. National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
offices nationwide in which charges are filed and investigated. 3 A
regional director has the authority to negotiate settlements, issue com-
plaints, advise parties to withdraw, and dismiss charges. 4 This dismissal
may be appealed to the Office of Appeals in Washington, subject to final
approval by the General Counsel. I5 After a final decision by the Counsel,
there is no judicial review of his refusal to prosecute.16
While the number of complaints issued varies with the individual
General Counsel, the office has never attempted to prosecute every
charge.'" Since 1950, the NLRB has issued standards indicating the
categories of cases suitable for consideration. 18 Applying these guidelines
and strict evidentiary rules, 9 the General Counsel's Office serves as a
screening device to limit the number of charges that reach the complaint
stage. 20 For example, 31,253 unfair labor practice charges were filed in
fiscal year 1975 and 9,169 (30.2 percent) were judged meritorious.
2 1
Only 3,983 of these charges resulted in the issuance of a complaint. 22 The
majority were adjusted or settled, usually without the participation of the
charging party. 23 Thus, only 12.7 percent of the original number were
litigated.
B. History of the Unreviewable Discretion of the General Counsel
When Congress establishes an administrative agency to enforce
federal laws, there is a general presumption in favor of judicial review of
that agency's actions unless unreviewability is a part of the statutory
scheme.24 Nowhere in the NLRA is there a provision prohibiting judicial
13. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 4.08, at 194 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS (1970 Treatise)],
14. Id. "If investigation reveals that there has been no violation of the National Labor
Relations Act or the evidence is insufficient to substantiate the charge, the regional director
recommends withdrawal of the charge by the person who filed." 29 C.F.R. § 101.5 (1973). If
the complaining party does not withdraw upon request, the Regional Director dismisses the
charges. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1973). See Morris, supra note 7, at 483.
15. DAVIS (1970 Treatise), supra note 13, § 4.08 at 194.95. Nevertheless, initial
determinations by regional directors are overturned in only 7 to 12% of the appeals. Nash,
Labor Law Practice in the NLRB General Counsel's Office in LAB. LAW DEV. 1976, 123, 137
(Southwest Legal Foundation).
16. E.g., Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972); Mayer v. Ardman, 391 F.2d
889 (6th Cir. 1968); Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579 (4th
Cir. 1964); Retail Employees Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962); NLRB v.
Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957); Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir 1952).
17. Haleston Drug Store v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 422 n.5 (9th Cir. 1951).
18. DAvIs (1958 Treatise), supra note 11, § 4.07 at 258.
19. The General Counsel requires evidence tantamount to a prima facie case. See
Bartosic, supra note 7.
20. Bartosic, supra note 7, at 653.
21. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 9-11 (1975). Therefore 69.8% of the charges filed were
dismissed without any right for the charging party to appeal.
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id. at 5.
24. "-[Only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legisla-
tive intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); accord, Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
157 (1970).
review of the General Counsel's actions;2 5 yet, the courts, relying on the
public purpose of the Act, have declined to recognize the right of
individuals to review. If the purpose of the agency is protection of the
public, then unreviewability can be justified because a private party
would have no recognized right to have his claim adjudicated or re-
medied.
This judicial interpretation of the Act was propounded as early as
1940, seven years before the position of General Counsel was created,
when the Supreme Court refused to recognize the right of a private party
to enforce an NLRB order. 26 The Court explained that "[t]he Board as a
public agency acting in the public interest, not any private [individual]
. . . is chosen as the instrument to assure protection" against unfair
labor practices. 27 One year later in Jacobsen v. NLRB, 28 the Third
Circuit held that the Board has absolute discretion to decide how to
proceed. The court of appeals stated in dictum that
the Board does not have to cause a complaint to be issued.
or proceed to prohibit any unfair labor practices complained of.
The course to be pursued rests in the sound discretion of the
Board . . . . That discretion is not a legal discretion at least
insofar that upon the abuse of it the several circuit courts of
appeals might compel the Board to issue a complaint.2 9
These two decisions established the two major principles relied upon
by judges to justify unreviewability-public purpose of the Act and
deference to administrative discretion. When the power to prosecute was
transferred to the General Counsel by the Taft-Hartley Act, the courts
observed that neither the language granting the power to issue com-
plaints 30 nor the intent of Congress to redress public grievances was
changed. 3 The implication that Congress approved of judicial absention
lent further support to the doctrine of unreviewability, and today the
precedent is virtually unassailable.
32
Suits challenging the finality of the General Counsel's decisions
25. Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (1st Cir. 1972). See note 3, infra.
26. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
27. Id. at 265.
28. 120 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941).
29. Id. at 100.
30. Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951); Lincourt v. NLRB,
170 F.2d 307 (1st Cir. 1948).
31. There is no doubt that Congress intended to make the general counsel's
decision unreviewable by the Board. President Truman recognized this in his veto
message, pointing out that the general counsel 'might usurp the Board's responsi-
bility for establishing policy under the act'; and numerous Senators and Represen-
tatives criticized the creation of a 'labor czar.'
International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (foot-
notes omitted).
32. [Wlhile there is no provision in the Act explicitly prohibiting judicial review
I it must be concluded that judicial abstention has been fully acquiesced in
by Congress. Indeed, in the face of overwhelming authority in favor of non-
reviewability, the situation seems paradigmatic of one which is 'committed to
agency discretion' under section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (Ist Cir. 1972).
have consistently been unsuccessful. The NLRA grants parties the right
to appeal from a "final order" of the Board. 33 The courts have distin-
guished, however, between a final order of the NLRB and the General
Counsel's action in refusing to issue a complaint Final orders consist of
actions taken by the Board either dismissing a complaint issued by the
Counsel or ordering a remedy after a decision.3" A decision of Counsel
not to prosecute is an administrative determination with insufficient
formality to constitute a final order "within the meaning of the Act." 35 It
also follows that after dismissal of charges by Counsel, a disappointed
party cannot obtain a mandatory injunction compelling the Board to issue
a final order on matters in which no complaint was issued.3 6 Nor can the
Board be forced to issue a complaint on its own or order the General
Counsel to do so." Dismissal of charges by Counsel has survived attacks
alleging arbitrary and capricious action, 38 denial of due process, 39 and
failure to investigate thoroughly 4
0
Although several decisions suggest that in extreme situations judicial
review of Counsel action may be appropriate,4' never has a judge ordered
33. National Labor Relations Act, § 10, U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
34. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
35. Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 307 (1948); accord United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v.
Ardman, 258 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
36. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 233 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1956); Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d
187 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
37. United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ardman, 258 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
aff'd, 366 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
38. E.g., Retail Employees Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In contrast to the absolute unreviewabili-
ty of the General Counsel's authority, the Board's decisions in representation cases (an
administrative determination normally not subject to review) may be attacked in two
exceptional situations: if there is a claim of denial of constitutional rights, Fay v. Douds,
172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949), or the Board has proceeded in direct violation of the statute,
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). On a few occasions these exceptions have been
utilized to overturn erroneous Board decisions, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372
U.S. 10 (1963), but the exceptions have never been successfully applied to the General
Counsel as well. United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ardman, 258 F. Supp. 758, 761
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
39. In Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (Ist Cir. 1972) the court rejected a discharged
employee's request to compel a hearing prior to final dismissal on the following three
grounds: (1) there is no "entitlement" to have an unfair labor practice complaint issue, (2)
the interest he was seeking to protect was not "essential to his continued existence," and (3)
the Act protected public, not private, rights. Id. at 215. The right to have an unfair labor
practice litigated was not as absolute as a welfare recipient's statutory entitlement to
benefits as in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 250 (1970). Citing Saez, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals dismissed a due process argument on similar grounds, noting the limited re-
sources of the Board and the possibility of increased delay. Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d
592, 593 (8th Cir. 1972).
40. In Mayer v. Ardman, 391 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1968), the plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion requiring the General Counsel to merely investigate a filed claim, not to necessarily file
a complaint. The court rejected this request, stating that "it is clear that despite his
protestations otherwise, plaintiff is in effect asking this court to tell the General Counsel to
perform an act which he in his discretion has determined not to do, or which he has done to
his own satisfaction." !d. at 891. "It is well settled that the National Labor Relations Act
precludes District Court review of the manner in which the General Counsel . . . investi-
gates . . . and determines whether to issue a complaint." Id. at 889 (citing Dunn v. Retail
Clerks Ass'n, 307 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1962).
41. "The courts should not be asked to take over the work of the General Counsel's
General Counsel to issue a complaint.4" Even the Supreme Court, while
not expressly ruling on the issue,4 3 recited in dictum that "the Board's
General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to institute an unfair labor
complaint."I Any reservation that the judiciary may feel regarding the
advisibility of resting broad powers in one person4- have been overcome
by the doctrines of public right46 and respect for administrative discretion.
III. Policy Considerations
.A. Justification for Unreviewability
Those in favor of retaining the position of General Counsel in its
present form cite the doctrine of "public right," the system of checks that
is already a part of NLRB procedure, and the increased delay and
formality that would result from additional court review.
1. Doctrine of Public Right.-The purpose of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, as announced in the preamble and construed by case
law, is primarily protection of the public "to promote the free flow of
commerce, . .. [and) to provide orderly and peaceful procedures" for
dealing with interference, to proscribe practices "inimical to the general
welfare, and to protect the rights of the public." 47 In Amalgamated
Utility Workers v. Edison Co. ,48 the Supreme Court, interpreting this
language, declared that the rights of the public are paramount in an unfair
labor practice adjudication.4 9 This view came to be known as the doctrine
of "public right."
The Court used several avenues to reach this conclusion. First, the
Court conceded to Congress the right to proscribe certain practices and to
vest the Board with exclusive authority to prevent them.5" The underlying
congressional intent in vesting exclusive authority in the Board was to
"dispel the confusion resulting from dispersion of authority" and to
Office, or to scrutinize his decisions in matters of the present kind, except perhaps in the
most extreme situations." Retail Employees Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
42. In Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1964), after the General
Counsel had issued a complaint, he was ordered to amend. The court in Council of Laborers
Local 1184 v. Ardman, 318 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1970), ruled that the General Counsel's
decision as to the running of the statute of limitations was erroneous, but emphasized that
initiation of proceedings was entirely within his discretion. "If, after considering the merits
of the plaintiff's charges, [General Counsel Ardmanl concludes that no complaint should
issue, no judicial review of [his] determination may be had." Id. at 636.
43. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 US. 274, 205 n.2
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
45. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 47-56 and accompanying text infra.
47. Labor Management Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
48. 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
49. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
50. When analyzed by the Court, each procedure created by the statute supported the
conclusion that the Board was intended to possess exclusive authority over every aspect of
unfair labor practices. 309 U.S. at 264-66.
establish a single body to develop a national labor policy." Private
actions could result in conflicting interpretations when uniformity and
predictability on a national scale were the goals. Congressional reports
that indicated that no private cause of action was contemplated were cited
as additional authority.52 Finally, the Court relied on testimony that the
NLRB was analogous to the Federal Trade Commission, which did not
recognize or vindicate private rights.
53
The public right doctrine promulgated in Amalgamated Utility
Workers was adopted by lower courts that considered challenges to the
dismissal of complaints.5 4 Consequently, case law maintains that the Act
does not confer private rights5 and an injured individual has no indepen-
dent right to have his claim adjudicated if, in the judgment of the General
Counsel, litigation would not advance the public good. The agency, not
the judicial branch, has been given the task of deciding whether the
policies of the Act would be best served by dismissal, settlement, or
adjudication, 56 and the courts will not interfere with this administrative
determination.
2. Deference to Administrative Discretion and Procedure.-It
was impossible for congressional lawmakers to anticipate every rule that
would be necessary to cover the many variable fact situations that arise in
labor law . 7 Therefore, Congress created the NLRA to formulate national
labor policy according to the guidelines set out in the Act. 8 The courts
recognized that to carry out this mandate the Board should have discretion
to decline jurisdiction when adjudication would not promote the purposes
of the Act. 59 The preliminary screening process of the Counsel's Office
51. SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., 15 (1935), cited in Amalgamated Util.
Workers v. Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 267 (1940).
52. Both the House and Senate Reports reiterated that the purpose of the Act was to
create a paramount authority to replace the confusing situation of overlapping jurisdictions.
Id. at 267. "No private right of action is contemplated. Essentially the unfair labor practices
listed are matters of public concern, by their nature and consequences, present or poten-
tial." H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935).
53. 309 U.S. at 268. For an indication that the FTC's actions may be reviewable,
compare Moog Indus. v. FTC, 335 U.S. 411 (1958) with K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
THE SEVENTIES § 28.00-2, at 609 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DAvIs (1976 Treatise)].
54. E.g., Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 307 (1948); United Elec. Contractor's Ass'n v.
Ardman, 258 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
55. NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1957).
56. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307 (1959).
The policy of the Act, as construed in Amalgamated Util. Workers, requires that
the Board be recognized as empowered to determine when the possibly slight
merit of a charge is outweighed by the sure and speedy concessions, the industrial
harmony restored, and the saving of Board resources which a settlement can
achieve.
Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.
1964).
57. With respect to labor relations, the NLRB as an administrative agency is a
necessity since it is impossible for Congress to anticipate and formulate in adv-
ance all the rules governing all the special circumstances and variable situations to
which the broad general principles of labor policy must be applied.
Bartosic, supra note 7, at 659 (footnote omitted).
58. NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1957).
59. Id.
has enabled the Board to guide national labor policy by limiting litigation
to important and controversial cases.
60
Moreover, the screening process is structured to provide charging
parties opportunity for separate and independent review of adverse deci-
sions. 6 1 Dismissals by the General Counsel may be reconsidered by his
office and, on occasion, reversed. 62 Despite his harsh criticism of unlim-
ited prosecutorial discretion in general, 63 Professor Kenneth Davis has
conceded that the system of precedents, internal review, and procedural
protections within the General Counsel's Office is "deserving of admira-
tion. "' Advocates of the current system would therefore argue that court
review is unnecessary.
3. Difficulties with Additional Review .- Any provision for addi-
tional review of the General Counsel's decisions could aggravate the
greatest problem of the NLRB structure--delay in processing unfair labor
practice complaints. 65 In fiscal year 1975 the median number of days
from the filing of charges to the issuance of complaints was fifty-four
days; 66 from the filing of a complaint to a final Board decision approxi-
mately 350 days elapsed, 67 however. Adding review of disputed dismiss-
als to the other NLRB responsibilities would cause further delay in
processing all labor disputes. 68 Moreover, it would increase the financial
strain on the agency's limited resources by requiring the General Counsel
to devote additional time and personnel to defend his decisions before the
Board or the courts.69 Another drawback is the sacrifice of informality
60. Congress intended one uniform body of law promulgated by the NLRB. This
requires a selective process of choosing "test" cases in areas in which clear delineation of
policy is necessary.
61. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
62. Nash, supra note 15, at 138.
63. "Probably abuse of the prosecuting power by the regulatory agencies is ten or
twenty times as common as abuse of the combined powers of adjudication and rule
making." DAVIS (1970 Treatise), supra note 13, at 188. "Prosecutorial discretion is utterly
uncontrolled-no procedural safeguards, no opennesss, no guiding standards, no findings or
reasons, no system of precedents, no administrative review, no protection against politics or
other extraneous influence and no judicial review." DAVIS (1976 Treatise), supra note 53,
Preface at xi-xii.
64. DAVIS (1970 Treatise), supra note 13, at 196. "The system of the NLRB General
Counsel contains the major elements of a full structuring of discretionary power-findings,
reasons, precedents, checks through appeals and through internal supervision, and pro-
cedural protections." Id. at 195-96.
65. In her testimony before a House Subcommittee the NLRB Chairman, Betty
Murphy, indicated her continuing concern with the increased processing time required for
each case. She stated that she had created a committee to study procedures to reduce by
thirty days the Board processing time. Oversight Hearings on the NLRB, supra note 8, at 6.
For a summary of the committee recommendations, see A Work Speedup at the NLRB,
Bus. WEEK, Nov. 8, 1976, at 96-103.
66. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 13 (1975).
67. Id.
68. "[T]he primary principle of the Board is that it moves too slowly once it reaches
the hearing stage of a matter. Requiring a trial-type hearing whenever a charging party
disagrees with a decision of the Board officials would further complicate the Board's task."
Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592, 593 (8th Cir. 1972).
69. Comment, Proposals for Modification of Unfair Labor Practice Procedures Under
the NLRA, 9 STAN. L. REV. 155, 159-60 (1956).
resulting from the pyramiding of one more formal procedure on top of the
current system. 70 Emphasis is on the informality of theprocess, 7 which
is a significant factor in encouraging "amiable and peaceful settlement of
labor disputes.' '72
B. Case for Addition of a Private Cause of Action
1. Deprival of Relief for Aggrieved Employees.-While the argu-
ments of public right and administrative efficiency continue to persuade
the courts, the inequity and desirability of allowing independent actions
are becoming evident. The congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction
over unfair labor practices has been interpreted to preempt state and
federal jurisdiction in cases "arguably subject" to Board domain.7 3 A
number of exceptions have been carved out by statute, 74 the courts, 7 5 and
the Labor Board,76 but an employee whose case is not accepted by the
General Counsel could be deprived of a forum. 77 For example, in Amal-
gamated Association of Street Employees v. Lockridge,78 a state court
judgment in favor of an employee awarding damages for discriminatory
discharge was overturned by the Supreme Court. 79 Because his claim was
subject to exclusive NLRA jurisdiction, the plaintiff's only avenue for
relief was through that agency.' ° In his dissent, Justice Douglas
graphically explained the hardships imposed on individuals by the
preemption doctrine.
From the viewpoint of an aggrieved employee, there is not
a trace of equity in this long-drawn expensive remedy. If he
musters the resources to exhaust the administrative remedy,
the chances are that he too will be exhausted. . . . If the
General Counsel refuses to act, then the employee is . . .
barred from relief in either state or federal court. . . . When
we tell a sole individual that his case is arguably within the
jurisdiction of the Board, we in practical effect deny him any
remedy. 8'
70. Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (Ist Cir. 1972).
71. Nash, supra note 15, at 150.
72. Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (Ist Cir. 1972); accord, Branden v. Herman, 468
F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972).
73. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). See Come,
Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application
of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435 (1970).
74. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (private cause of
action for breach of collective bargaining agreement); § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (private action
for secondary boycott activity). See notes 142-50 and accompanying test infra.
75. Vaca v. Sipes,386 U.S. 171 (1967) (duty of fair representation); see Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,309-32 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
76. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955) (arbitration).
77. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971);
Plumbers Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). See Comment, State Jurisdiction Over
Unfair Labor Practices, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 124, 137 (1967); Note, Damages for Unfair
Labor Practices, 40 IND. L.J. 37, 38 (1964). See note 83 infra.
78. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 285-91.
81. Id. at 304-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
Lack of basic discovery tools for gathering evidence to present a
claim 82 and emphasis on public policy by the General Counsel's Office
could result in the dismissal of meritorious charges that cannot be ad-
judicated elsewhere.83 The absence of any form of judicial review can
mean that a meritorious case will be denied even a hearing.
2. Possibility ofAbuse. -Unchecked power to determine whether
a claim will be litigated carries with it a potential for abuse. 84 The General
Counsel possesses authority that, "if withheld or abused, can visit serious
and irreparable harm upon those who, under the scheme of the NLRA,
cannot obtain the help of judicial intervention." 5 Criticism is leveled at a
system that institutionalizes the opportunity for arbitrary action, rather
than the conduct of individuals occupying the office. 86
The opinions expressed by experienced practitioners that seemingly
meritorious cases were rejected without reason 87 are necessarily subjec-
tive. The decision whether to issue a complaint, however, is clearly one
over which reasonable men may disagree8 8 and, therefore, should not rest
with one person. It is based on facts uncovered by a preliminary investi-
gation unaided by discovery techniques.
The General Counsel is restricted by manpower and budgetary
82. Since the Federal Rules of Discovery do not apply to an NLRB proceeding, an
individual may have difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence to support a complaint.
Barker, Significant Developments in Damage Suits for Secondary Activity Under Section 303
of Taft-Hartley, LAB. LAW DEV. 1975, 245, 257 (Southwest Legal Foundation).
83. A colleague of Lockridge, similarly dismissed from the Union, filed a formal
charge with the Regional Director that was dismissed for insufficient evidence. He then
instituted an action in state court and obtained an award for damages that was overturned on
the basis of federal preemption. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 280 n.3 (1971).
84. Representative John Erlenborn criticized the broad power of the General Counsel
to act or not to act. "The choice is his, and that creates a danger that he may use it
arbitrarily ....
I will say . . . that where the possibility exists for abuse, sooner or later, somebody's
rights will be abused." 120 CONG. REC. E 4416 (Extensions of the remarks of Representative
Erlenborn).
85. Dunn v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 307 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1962).
86. The defect in the system is in the office itself-in the absence of opportunity
for review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint, and in the
absence of a right of the charging party to process his own charge in lieu of action
by the General Counsel.
Morris, supra note 7, at 483 (footnote omitted).
87. An attorney representing the Retail Clerks and other unions cited an example of
mistaken judgment. An objection to an election and unfair labor practice charge were filed
simultaneously and rejected by both the Regional Director and General Counsel. The
election charge was appealed to the NLRB and the Board reversed both findings by the
Counsel, saying the employer did commit an unfair labor practice. Oversight Hearings on
NLRB, supra note 8, at 303; Morris, supra note 7, at 482. He went on to state that the
Regional Director and General Counsel often refuse to "issue a complaint in close cases in
spite of their many protestations otherwise." Oversight Hearings on NLRB, supra note 8,
at 304.
88. Statement of Chamber of Commerce, Oversight Hearings on the NLRA, H.R.
8110 etc., Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgt. Rel. of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976).
constraints, 89 which necessarily limit the number of cases that can be
prosecuted. As the number of charges filed continues to escalate, a
greater percentage of borderline cases 9° will probably be dismissed and
the possibility of further abuse similarly arises. Because of the strict
evidentiary standards applied in accepting cases, the Counsel has been
successful in over eighty percent of the suits that he finally prosecuted.9
Senator John Tower, a proponent of the addition of a private cause
of action,92 has expressed a common concern that the General Counsel
should not be vested with such tremendous authority to influence national
labor policy. "The General Counsel . . . has such absolute power,
potentially capable of thwarting the aim of the entire statute regardless of
the 'good faith' in which he engages in his activities. He can ignore court
rulings by failing to prosecute a complaint-or even [Bloard decisions by
the same negative process." 93 There are many who believe that sole
discretion to prosecute creates a danger of selective processing.9 4
3. Recognition of Private Rights.-The NLRB was established in
1935 to promulgate a uniform body of substantive law that would strike a
balance between the rights of employees to organize and employers to
govern their enterprises. 95 It was necessary that the NLRB possess pri-
mary jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims to achieve this uni-
formity, 9' but the Board could handle only a limited number of cases.
97
Ability to decline jurisdiction was a necessary tool for maintaining a
workable case load and was justified by emphasizing the public purposes
of the Act .98 Private actions at that time would have created confusion by
encouraging conflicting interpretations of the statute. 99 In the forty-two
years following the creation of the NLRB, however, a body of decisional
law has been developed that could now be applied by judges to remedy
89. Auto Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 219-20 n.15 (1965).
90. Morris, supra note 7, at 482.
91. Irving, Current Developments in the Office of the General Counsel-Substantive,
Procedural, Administrative, LAB. LAW DEV. 1976,67,71 (Southwestern Legal Foundation).
92. 179 CONG. REC. 6975-76 (Remarks of Senator Tower).
93. Id. at 6975.
94. Comment, 9 STAN. L. REV. 155, supra note 69, at 160.
95. Comment, State Jurisdiction Over Unfair Labor Practices, 16 DE PAUL L. REV.
124, 125 (1967).
%. Congress has made it clear that the Act is to be solely enforced by the Board
but not necessarily because it had its eye on the 'public' rather than the employee.
In a field so untried it was considered wise to give the enforcing agency complete
control of and responsibility for the formation of policy and for the intake of the
material best fitted for that purpose. . . . Congress might . . . have allowed
employees to sue in court. . , but this would have developed in the crucial trial
period rival systems of interpretation. . . . Initially this task [of developing
standards] may be best performed by a small group capable of exhaustive and
continuous discussion and decision. This means in turn a limited work load. Once
a body of doctrine has been developed, jurisdiction could conceivably, if there
were any strong reason for it, be placed on a nondiscretionary basis.
Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720, 728 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
97. Id.
98. NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1957).
99. See note 96 supra.
private wrongs.l'I The earlier justifications are now archaic and can no
longer justify the denial of private actions.
The NLRA is responsible for protecting the rights of employees to
organize or to refrain from joining a union by preventing unfair labor
practices.' 01 This goal cannot be fully accomplished without the addition
of a private cause of action. Other public agencies that protect individual
or group interests have a private analogue that provides individual re-
lief."° In fact, the NLRA is "almost alone in committing to the sole
enforcement of a public agency a policy which is universally recognized
as vindicating individual or group interests." 10 3 In recognizing the right
of a charging or charged party to intervene in appellate court proceedings,
the Supreme Court stated that the rhetoric of public interest should not be
applied to exclude recognition of private rights.'0 4 Despite the public
purposes of the Act, individual rights can be accommodated within the
statutory scheme. 10 5 The remedies for violations are personal-cease and
desist orders, reinstatement, back pay. 106 Those proposing an individual
action assert that in almost every federal agency private suits are actually
encouraged to supplement governmental prosecution efforts and to pro-
vide individual relief.' 0
IV. Federal Legislation Recognizing Private Actions
A. Antitrust Acts
Private suits abound in the area of antitrust litigation. The Sherman
Act,t"' in addition to entrusting the United States Attorney General with
prosecutory power, 109 authorizes private actions. Furthermore, section 4
of the Clayton Actt t0 grants to any person "injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" the right
to proceed in federal district court and to recover treble damages.' 1 '
I00. See notes 145-46 and accompanying text infra.
101. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1970).
102. For example, crimes prosecuted by United States and district attorneys have tort
analogies that can constitute the basis for an action to redress private grievances. Jaffe,
supra note 96, at 726-27. See notes 108-52 and accompanying text infra.
103. Jaffe, supra note 96, at 726.
104. The United States Supreme Court in Auto Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205
(1%5), recognized that a party whose vital interests are affected by the act is entitled to
intervene as a party in appellate proceedings.
In prior decisions, this Court has observed that the Labor Act recognizes the
existence of private rights within the statutory scheme. These cases have, to be
sure, emphasized the 'public interest' factor. To employ the rhetoric of 'public




106. National Labor Relations Act § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 162 (1970).
107. 119 CONG. REc. 6975 (Remarks of Senator Tower).
108. Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
109. Id. §4.
I0. Clayton Antitrust Act §§ 1-17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
Ill. Id. §15.
Although the ultimate purpose of the Act is to maintain a "free and
competitive economy" for the protection of the public,"12 private actions
are encouraged as an "ancillary force of private investigators" to aid in
achieving this goal. 113 The Supreme Court expressly ruled that the reme-
dies are intended to be "cumulative not mutually exclusive," proceeding
simultaneously or independently of one another.' 1 4 Federal judges have
liberally construed section 4115 to permit private actions because the civil
action serves not only to redress private injuries," 6 but to complement
government efforts."1
B. Securities and Exchange Act
The Securities and Exchange Act 118 established the Securities and
Exchange Commission to enforce the Act or regulations in federal
courts." 9 Section 16(b) explicitly grants to the issuer or owner of a
security a right to recover profit from a short swing sale or purchase in a
private suit. 2 Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a private right
of action not explicitly granted by the statute could be implied from the
language of the Act to effectuate congressional policy.
1 21
In J.L Case v. Borak, 122 the section granting federal courts exclu-
sive jurisdiction1 23 was interpreted to provide a private cause of action for
violation of section 14(a), which bans proxy solicitation to protect inves-
tors.1 24 The goal of protecting stockholders, the court concluded, implied
the availability of judicial relief when necessary. 25 Private enforcement
was welcomed as a supplement to the Commission's actions.
126
112. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957).
113. In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litigation, 387 F. Supp.
906, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The private antitrust action is an important and effective method
of combating unlawful and destructive business practices. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246
F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957).
114. United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
115. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); accord, Sil-
vercup Bakers, Inc. v. Fink Baking Corp., 273 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
116. Lanier Business Prod. v. Graymar Co., 355 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1973).
117. In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry. Co. Securities & Antitrust Litigation, 387 F.
Supp. 906 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
118. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1971).
119. Id. § 78u(e), § 78aa.
120. Id. § 78p(b).
121. J.lI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
122. Id.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). Section 27 reads in pertinent part, "The District Courts of
the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations there-
under."
124. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person. . . in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit . . . any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security . .. registered pursuant to
section 12 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
125. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
126. Id. at 433. While the primary purpose of the SEA is to regulate and control the
Relying on this liberal Supreme Court interpretation of the Securities
Act, the court of appeals in Medical Committee for Human Rights v.
SEC'27 held that even dismissal of a petition by the Commission can be
reviewed. 128 This action was sufficiently final to warrant judicial con-
sideration, especially in view of the strong presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative actions. 129 Thus, under the SEA, unlike
the NLRA, refusal to prosecute is a final action subject to court review. 3 0
C. Equal Employment Opportunities Act
In 1972 the Equal Employment Opportunities Act 131 was amended
to explicitly grant to individuals the right to proceed in a civil suit if the
EEOC fails to prosecute a charge. Unless a conciliation agreement has
been entered, the complaining party may file an action in federal court' 32
if a complaint is dismissed or not acted upon within a specified time. 133
These amendments codified a trend in the circuit courts that inferred
a private right of action arising after dismissal of a charge. 34 Even prior
to 1972 an EEOC finding that no reasonable cause existed to support a
claim did not bar judicial review of the claim. 35 These cases generally
relied on the absence of clear legislative intent to preclude review13 6 and
the presumption in favor of judicial review. 137 Reluctant to allow an
administrative decision by the EEOC to prejudice the rights of an indi-
iidual, one judge concluded "that the ultimate decision whether the
claim is real or fanciful must be for the courts." 3
market for securities to protect the national economy and credit, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970), it is
also aimed at protecting individual investors. One purpose of the NLRA mandate is to
protect the exercise by workers of freedom of association, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). It is not
Congress, but the courts that create exceptions allowing private actions. Jaffe, supra note
96, at 726. Just as the SEA mandate allows private relief, so should agrieved persons be
granted this same right under the NLRA when the avenue of judicial relief is necessary to
provide a remedy.
127. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
128. "Review limited to the task of correcting such legal defects is consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Securities Act in J.L Case Co. v. Borak. " Id. at 675.
129. Id. at 666, 675. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
130. Compare Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673 (D.C. Cir.
1970) with DAvIS (1976 Treatise), supra note 53, at 609.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-15 (1970).
132. Id. The injured party has 90 days in which to act. In circumstances deemed
reasonable, the judge may appoint an attorney and waive fees, costs, or security.
133. The EEOC has 180 days upon which to settle or dismiss. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
134. E.g., Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971);
Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
135. Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 1970).
136. Id. at 334; see Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
137. Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 1970) (citing Association of
Data Processing Service Org's, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)); Grimm v. Westinghouse
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
138. Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1970).
D. Labor Acts
I. Fair Labor Standards Act.-Within the area of federal labor
legislation, private employees may proceed in independent civil actions
for the recovery of wages due under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 13 9
Section 16(b) provides an individual with the following three options: (1)
suit may be initiated by the employee, (2) a class action on behalf of
consenting employees may be maintained, and (3) the Secretary of Labor
may, upon request, institute an action. 4 o The right to proceed indepen-
dently is terminated only if the Labor Secretary files a complaint. 1 ' This
statutory scheme enables both the government and private sectors to work
together to enforce wage and hour laws and permits the claimant to tailor
procedure to fit the exigencies of his situation.
2. NLRA - Sections 301 and 303.-The NLRA also has two
provisions authorizing individuals to proceed in a private action simulta-
neously with or independently of NLRB prosecution of unfair labor
practice violations. Section 301 recognizes a private right of action for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement 42 and section 303 recognizes
a similar remedy for secondary boycott activity. 43 Under section 301 a
suit for damages arising from violation of an existing employment con-
tract may be brought in federal district court without respect to the
amount in controversy or diversity. '4 The courts have shown no difficul-
ty in upholding concurrent jurisdiction. 4 The Supreme Court pointed
out that, on occasion, the Board has "declined to exercise jurisdiction to
deal with unfair labor practices in circumstances where, in its judgment,
federal labor policy would best be served by leaving the parties to other
processes of the law."'14
While section 301 generally entails application of contract law,
section 303 requires application of labor principles. Any party "in-
jured in his business or property" by reason of secondary boycott activity
may institute an action for damages in federal court. 148 The purpose of the
provision is to confine labor disputes solely to the primary parties,' 49 but
it has been criticized for singling out labor organizations as the only
parties who may be held liable for damages. -50 Commentators also find
139. 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (1970).
140. d. § 216(b).
141. Id. Recovery includes unpaid wages, liquidated damages, cost of suit, and attor-
ney fees.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
143. Id. § 187.
144. Id. § 185.
145. E.g., Boy's Market Inc., v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Eazor
Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 376 F. Supp. 841 (1974).
146. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198 n.6 (1962).
147. 29 U.S.C § 158(b) (4) (1970).
148. Id. §187.
149. Gilmour v. Wood Lathers Local 74, 223 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. 111. 1963).
150. Section 303 is "unilateral, and an anathema to labor organizations, since its
fault with the allowance of independent private suits because they open
the possibility that NLRB decisions might be res judicata in a subsequent
private damage action. Selective application of res judicata may prevent
needless, expensive relitigation of issues and avoid the possibility of
inconsistent results,' 15 but can discourage settlement of cases. 5 2 A claim-
ant is unlikely to settle a dispute before the Board when he knows that a
definitive administrative decision can establish his liability in a subse-
quent suit.
This survey illustrates congressional and judicial recognition of the
usefulness of the private action in supplementing government enforce-
ment of the law. An individual cause of action has often been implied by
judicial construction when no other relief is available.1 53 Despite an
overwhelming NLRB case load and the plight of individuals without
recourse to the courts, a private cause of action after dismissal of com-
plaints has yet to be recognized. 154 The courts have abdicated the respon-
sibility'5 5 to protect private rights, and Congress is now studying two
proposals to remedy resultant injustice.
V. Suggested Amendments
Spurred by the lobbying efforts of both labor and management,1
5 6
the House Subcommittee on Labor and Management Relations has con-
sidered proposals that would reduce or completely repeal the exclusive
power of the General Counsel to prosecute unfair labor practice charges.
One bill proposed expansion of section 303 coverage 5 7 and a second
recommended transfer of unfair labor practice cases to the district
courts. 158
provisions apply only to labor organizations and only they may be subject to an award of
damages. In this respect, it represents an imbalance in the statute. ... Barker, supra
note 82, at 245.
151. Painters District Counsel, No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081
(5th Cir. 1969); 67 MICH. L. REV. 824 (1969); see note 170 infra.
152. The application of res judicata could discourage settlement of claims before the
NLRB by creating a situation in which the charging party, by resisting settlement, may have
his case litigated by the General Counsel, a final order entered, and summary judgment in a
court action. Settlement, especially with no admission, would necessitate a full court trial on
the merits at the individual's expense prior to determination of damages. Barker, supra note
82, at 258.
153. The power [given to courts] to enforce implies the power to make effective
the right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of
recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions
normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case.
Deckert v. Independence Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
154. After dismissal of an employment discrimination charge by the EEOC, an indi-
vidual has the right to a final court determination. See notes 131-138 and accompanying text
supra. After dismissal of a union discrimination charge, there is no right to review. See note
80 and accompanying text supra.
155. Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1972). See note 25 and accompanying text
supra.
156. Pushing to Rewrite Labor Relations Act, Bus. WEEK, Oct. II, 1969, at 50; Labor-
Business Sees a Way to Change NLRB, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 29, 1969, at 102.
157. H.R. 8110, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
158. H.R. 9214, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
In 1976 hearings were held on H.R. 8110,159 which amended
section 303 to include suits for infractions of section 8(a) (3)1 60 and 8(b)
(2).161 Any discrimination on the basis or union activity would have made
the union of the employer liable for treble damages, cost of suit and
attorney's fees. 16 2 A final NLRB decree was to be prima facie evidence in
a later suit.
63
The proposed legislation was supported by organized labor' 64 be-
cause it was intended to discourage use of unfair labor practices to hinder
and delay unionization. 165 Treble damages were to make the conse-
quences of delay more expensive.' 66 In addition, recovery of damages
were to be more adequate compensation for losses actually sustained than
the NLRB remedies of back pay and reinstatement. 167 Finally, treble
159. H.R. 8110 read in part,
(c) Any person who shall suffer financial injury by reason of any violation of
sections 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2) may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States .. .without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee. A final judgment or decree heretofore rendered by the
Board to the effect that a defendant has violated said sections 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2)
shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding
brought by him.
160. 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(3) (1970) (employer encouraging or discouraging union member-
ship).
161. Id. at § 158(b)(2) (union causing or attempting to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate).
162. See note 159 supra.
163. This provision was similar to section 4 of the Clayton Act. See notes 110-11 and
accompanying text supra.
164. A Work Speedup at the NLRB, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 8, 1976, at 103.
165. Louis Paulton, counsel for the International Association of Machinists and Aeros-
pace Workers noted,
This relief is not only necessary but highly desirable for it will forestall the
actions by employers in deliberately violating the Labor-Management Relations
Act.
I cannot overemphasize that it is time that Congress put teeth into the
enforcement of the Labor-Management Relations Act. At the present time an
employer or a union can violate the act and in most instances receive a slap on the
wrist for committing such violation. For example, an employer can deliberately
refuse to bargain with the union and again after 2 or 3 years of litigation the slap
on the wrist takes place by requiring the employer to then bargain with the union.
In the meantime the employees have lost the fruits of collective bargaining. Their
agent has been substantially weakened. They have been deprived of wage in-
creases, fringe benefits and other benefits of a collective bargaining agreement,
and until a contract has been signed, pay nothing. The employer or the union who
violates the act should be required to pay damages to the employees because of
such violation. The Congress should without further ado provide adequate reme-
dies compensatory and/or punitive for violations of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. Such remedies should adequately provide payment to the employees
for violations of a Federal law.
Oversight Hearings on the NLRA, supra note 88, at 457.
166. "Back pay awards are tax deductible as a legitimate business expense. And if a
fired employee is able to find work before being reinstated, his earnings during the period
are subtracted from what the company must pay him." McConville, supra note 8, at 393.
167. Studies of the reinstatement remedy have concluded that it is essentially useless as
a remedial device. The number of persons accepting reinstatement decreases as time passes
so that only about 5% accept if the period is over six months. The reasons for declining are,
in order of frequency, fear of company retaliation, better job offers, and immediate need for
back pay. Aspin, Job Reinstatement Under Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 94 MON. LAB. REv.
57, March 1971; Stephens & Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement Remedy under the
National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. LAW J. 31 (1974).
damages could have provided an incentive for individuals to aid the
government in enforcement of the NLRA. 16 s
Critics of H.R. 8110 argued that making a final order prima facie
evidence could encourage delay of trial pending the Board decision'
69
when prompt resolution of disputes is the statutory goal. The possibility
of inconsistent decisions from subsequent trials could increase confusion
in the labor area. 170 Another serious criticism was the change of the
purpose of the statute from remedial to punitive.'1
7
Recognizing these limitations, Mr. Thompson, Chairman of the
Committee on Education and Labor, has introduced the Labor Reform
Act of 1977, H.R. 8410.172 Instead of adding a private cause of action,
168. Cf. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957) (purpose of private
antitrust action).
169. [T]he lawyers will have a field day arguing whether the Board procedure
ought to be stayed pending court suit or whether the court suit ought to be stayed
pending the Board proceeding. The potential for new delay ought to make the
triple damage penalty well worthwhile for the deliberate offender.
Statement of Edward B. Miller, Esq. (former NLRB chairman), Oversight Hearings on
NLRB, supra note 8, at 248. This is similar to the res judicata argument presented against
currently existing private actions. See notes 151-52 and accompanying text supra.
170. [l]nconsistent findings are obviously quite possible under the 'completely
independent' doctrine and, indeed, have already occurred. Allowing different
tribunals to find that the same activities are both legal and illegal not only is
irrational, but also promotes confusion in a very sensitive and complex area of
labor relations. Total uniformity could not be achieved, but estoppel could be
applied in the majority of cases, and this would markedly decrease the opportuni-
ties for conflicts to arise.
67 MICH. L. REV. 824, 837 (1969) (footnotes omitted). But see Barker, supra note 82.
171. The avowed object of the amendment's supporters is to punish companies who
use delays inherent in the system to their advantage. While they are unlikely to deter
conscious wrongdoers, the provisions may punish unjustly the employer who honestly, but
mistakenly, attempts to discipline an employee. See statement of Edward B. Miller, Esq.
(former NLRB chairman), Oversight Hearings on NLRB, supra note 8, at 248. Many unfair
labor practice violations are close cases based on circumstantial evidence; indiscriminate
awards of punitive damages create a harshness inconsistent with the conciliatory purposes
of the Act. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-Il (1940); accord, Philip
Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1964). Unlike the Clayton Act, which
imposes criminal sanctions, see notes 110-1I and accompanying text supra, the NLRA
remedies have always been remedial.
172. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). H.R. 8410 reads in part,
(3) In a case in which the Board determines that any person has engaged in
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of subsection (a)(3) or (b)(2) of section
8 deprives an employee of employment while employees in a bargaining unit
which includes that employee are seeking representation by a labor organization
or during the period after a labor organization has first been recognized as a
representative defined in subsection (a) of section 9 in such unit until the first
collective-bargaining contract is entered into between the employer and the repre-
sentative, the measure of backpay for the period until a valid offer of reinstate-
ment is made shall be double the employee's wage rate at the time of the unfair
labor practice. In a case in which the Board determines that an unlawful refusal to
bargain prior to the entry into the first collective-bargaining contract between the
employer and the representative selected or designated by a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit has by a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit has taken place, the Board may award to the employees in that
unit compensation for the delay in bargaining caused by the unfair labor practice
which shall be measured by the difference between (i) the wages and other
benefits received by such employees during the period of delay, and (ii) the wages
and fringe benefits such employees were receiving at the time of the unfair labor
practice multiplied by the percentage change in wages and other benefits stated in
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' average wage and benefit settlements, quarterly
report of major collective-bargaining settlements, for the quarter in which the
the Reform Act expands the remedies available to the NLRB for viola-
tions of sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2). 173 The Board may award double the
employee's wages for an unlawful firing. 174 To remedy an unlawful
refusal to bargain, the Board may award the difference between wages
and benefits received by the employees and the same compensation
multiplied by the average percentage increase in wages for that quarter. 1
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Passage of H.R. 8410 would not correct the unfortunate situation in
which the employee must place all his hopes for obtaining relief for union
discrimination in the hands of the General Counsel. 176 While it seems to
be aimed exclusively at employer misbehavior, it is not as punitive as the
proposed H.R. 8110.177 Employees will not receive compensation for all
the damages suffered that a private right of action would afford.
A second proposal, the Modified District Court Plan, would amend
the Act to allow an injured party to file a complaint in the federal district
court if the General Counsel has refused to proceed upon request.
78
Upon a finding of reasonable cause, the court can litigate the issue of
delay began. If the Secretary of Labor certifies to the Board that the Bureau has,
subsequent to the effective date of the Labor Reform Act of 1977, instituted
regular issuance of a statistical compilation of bargaining settlements which the
Secretary determines would better effectuate the purposes of this subsection than
the compilation specified herein, the Board shall, in administering this subsection,
use the compilation certified by the Secretary.
The Labor Reform Act of 1977 passed the House on October 6, 1977 by a 257-163 vote. It
will be considered by the Senate early in 1978. House Hands Labor Major Legislative
Victory, HUMAN EVENTS, Oct. 22, 1977 at 1,6.
Earlier in the session, Chairman Thompson introduced H.R. 77, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1976), a stronger bill than H.R. 8410. The earlier bill included treble damages for employer
infractions to be awarded to unions and employees. William B. Gould, professor of law at
Stanford University, noted the strengths and weaknesses of the bill as follows:
[lit seems logical that these remedies, which are available in the antitrust and
equal employment opportunity fields, should be part of the board's arsenal under
the NLRA, although it may be that treble damages should be awarded only in the
case of repeated wrongdoing.
The real question is whether the remedies will work. In the case of treble
damages, it is quite possible that a number of managements will still find it
possible to engage in unlawful behavior despite the additional expense. And since
the Labor Reform Act [H.R. 771 does not provide for the revocation of existing
government contracts, the sanction may not be as awesome as is envisioned.
(Incidently the record of law enforcement with respect to equal opportunity,
where these penalties are available, is not particularly good.)
Gould, Prospects for Labor-Law Reform, THE NATION, April 16, 1977, at 466-68; see
Labor's New Southern Strategy, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 7, 1977, at 28-29; Storm Brews Over
Union Demands on Congress, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 7, 1977, at 88-89; Labor
Reform Faces Potent Opposition, BUSINESS WEEK, May 2, 1977, at 34-36. The Carter
Administration, however, has thrown its support behind the more moderate H.R. 8410.
Labor: Carter's Detente, NEWSWEEK, July 25, 1977, at 64-67.
173. See note 172 supra.
174. See note 172 supra.
175. See note 172 supra.
176. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
177. See note 171 supra.
178. Among other changes H.R. 9214 amends section 10 as follows:
(c)(1) Whenever a charge is filed with the General Counsel of the Board, he
shall promptly serve a copy of the charge upon the person against whom the
charge is made. Within a reasonable time thereafter, he shall file a complaint with
the appropriate court [federal district courts]. . . , unless he determines that the
charge is without basis in law or fact, in which case he shall promptly notify the
substantive rights. 179 Furthermore, the adjudication of all unfair labor
practices would be transferred to the court system, 80 leaving the Board
jurisdiction over regulatory functions only.I8' As before, all claims must
first be filed with the General Counsel, who then either files the com-
plaint with the federal court or dismisses it.
Aimed at repealing the sole authority of the General Counsel to act,
the proposed amendment would allow vindication of private wrongs
without creating a multiplicity of suits or aggravating a controversy over
the use of res judicata. 8 2 Dual review at the initial stage of proceedings,
with the additional evidence uncovered through discovery, would insure
that valid claims would be considered and frivolous ones rejected.' 83
Shifting NLRB membership has created difficulties in maintaining a
consistent and predictable national labor policy.' 8 4 On many occasions
the Board has reversed itself or overruled established precedent. 85 Exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction would encourage uniformity by stare decisis, at
least within each circuit, and decrease the potential influence of politics
on labor policy. 86 It is evident from their handling of the FLSA and
parties of such determination. Within ninety days after receiving such notice, the
charging party may file a complaint in any [appropriate] court . . . having juris-
diction . ..and, if the court determines that there is reasonable cause to proceed,
prosecute the complaint on his own initiative.
This bill was introduced in 1975, referred to committee, but not reported out during the 94th
Session.
179. See note 178 supra.
180. See note 178 supra.
181. The House sponsor, Congressman John Erlenborn, noted that the NLRB is better
suited to the regulatory function, i.e., certification of bargaining units and elections rather
than adjudication. Address by Congressman Erlenborn, supra note 6, at 225; Oversight
Hearings on the NLRA, supra note 88, at 19.
182. The controversy over res judicata and inconsistent decisions would not be a
problem. See notes 140-42 supra.
183. See Statement by the Chamber of Commerce, Oversight Hearings on NLRA,
supra note 88, at 16.
184. New law is made every time a new administration is elected, contributing, I
might add, to a rush on unfair labor practice complaints being filed, either because
the law is uncertain and in a state of flux with the result that the complaint is filed
because the charging party does not know what the law is, or simply because the
charging party hopes and with reasonable expectations, no doubt, that previous
board decisions will be reversed. The result is that Federal policy is made not by
the rule of law but by the rule of men and that the Board continually faces a
backlog of cases causing enormous delay in the administration of justice.
119 CONG. REC. 6975 (1974) (remarks of Senator Tower).
185. E.g., Lobue Bros., 109 NLRB 1182 (1954) was reversed in 1967 by DIT-MCO, 16
NLRB 1019. The Supreme Court in 1974 reversed this decision. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 270 (1973).
186. The truth is that the present system contributes to a fundamental lack of
uniformity. In those instances, and they are not infrequent, when a federal
appellate court disagrees with the Board, there is no prompt compliance. Instead,
the Board continues to apply its own doctrine or interpretation, even within the
geographical jurisdiction of that circuit, until overruled by the Supreme Court.
Thus, if a party has enough money to pay for an appeal to the court, he will be
governed by the appellate court's interpretation. On the other hand, those in the
same circuit who lack the funds are subject to the Board's interpretation on the
same issue. Inevitably, this situation gives rise to circuit shopping, a practice in
which litigants-again, if they have the means-will take their appeals to that
circuit which is most favorable to them. The Act currently permits that practice.
The District Court Plan would at least make for uniformity within each circuit,
regardless of a litigant's ability to pay for an appeal.
Address by Congressman Erlenborn, supra note 6, at 224.
section 303 and from the NLRB's occasional decisions to defer cases to
the courts when there is concurrent jurisdiction' 8 7 that federal judges are
capable of understanding and applying the Act.
There are, however, five equally compelling arguments against the
transfer of unfair labor practice adjudication into the federal court system.
First, the proposal, although favored by management, which claims that
the current NLRA application is labor-oriented,188 is opposed by those
who fear that the courts may be biased toward employers. 8 9 Second,
since no changes are proposed in the remedies applicable to the Act, 90
injured parties will still not be eligible for compensatory damages. Third,
if dismissal by the General Counsel is required before private parties are
afforded the opportunity to initiate suit, these parties are not given the
option to proceed through the courts independently. 9 '
Fourth, critics note that federal judges lack the expertise of adminis-
trative law judges and may experience difficulty in applying the more
technical provisions of the Act. 192 Finally and most importantly is the
inevitable increase in the district court workload that would result from
unleashing all unfair labor complaints on the courts. 193 Such a large
influx of claims could result in even greater delay. in processing than now
exists in the NLRB.
187. See notes 138-42, 152-53 and accompanying text supra.
188. How Business Hopes to Change the Nation's Labor Laws, 66 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 16, 1969, at 68. See 119 CONG. REc. 6975 (1974) (remarks of Senator
Tower).
189. Critics raise the spectre of federal court abuse of injunctions sought by employers
to resist unionization prior to the passage of strict anti-injunction laws. Bartosic, supra note
7, at 648 n.7.
190. H.R. 9214 in amending Section 10(f) proposes to allow the court to enjoin and take
'affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay (but not
including the payment of damages in any other form), as may be necessary" to remedy an
unfair labor practice.
191. One complaint of practitioners is the lack of control over the handling of the cases
accepted by the General Counsel for prosecution. They have no access to the files of the
office and although they may be present at hearings, do not actually participate in strategy
or trying of a case. Statement of Thomas A. Beckly, Esq. (private practitioner), Oversight
Hearings on NLRA, supra note 88, at 62.
192. The following exchange took place between Congressman Frank Thompson,
chairman of the subcommittee, and Vincent Apruzzese, member of the Chamber of Com-
merce Labor Relations Committee:
Mr. Thompson: What percentage of district and circuit court judges would you
say have extensive labor law experience? . . .
Mr. Apruzzese: Circuit Court of Appeals, in my experience, I would say that
few have extensive labor law experience. That would apply in
. . court, . . . that is prior to ascending the bench.
Oversight Hearings on NLRA, supra note 88, at 34.
193. Adoption of the . . . district court plan would increase, not reduce, delay.
District court trial periods range from six to 39 months, with the courts in states
with heavy unfair practice loads generally having the longest trial time lag
periods. . . . [Slome 30,000 labor cases a year could potentially flood the district
courts. The resultant delay would not only dilute the effectiveness of the nation's
labor laws but also would tax the country's court system beyond tolerable limits
and produce delay in non labor cases.
Bartosic, supra note 7, at 656 (footnotes omitted). See Burger, Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J.
189 (1976).
VI. Conclusion
It is evident from judicial interpretation of the NLRA that the
General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to select cases for NLRB
consideration cannot be easily altered by the action of the courts. The
accumulated authority opposing review is so overwhelming that every
new approach is defeated by the rhetoric of public purpose, administra-
tive discretion, and sheer weight of authority.
The doctrine of public right, developed in response to a need for a
uniform national policy in a new and untried field, has outlived its
usefulness and is now a barrier to effective remedies. The unlimited
discretion of the General Counsel carries a potential for abuse that cannot
be justified by deference to administrative expertise. Deprival of remedy
by federal preemption and unprecedented delay in obtaining adequate
relief are compelling reasons to create a private right. Private suits
abound in other areas of federal administrative law to supplement the
efforts of federal prosecutors and to provide individual relief.
The mandate of the NLRB-to allow individuals to exercise free
choice in unionization and to peacefully settle disputes--could be furth-
ered by provision for actions by private parties. Federal courts have
shown their ability to understand and apply the NLRA and could do so
with greater consistency than the constantly changing Board. 94 Yet,
judicial abstention is so ingrained in the system that legislative action is
required to create impetus for change.
While Congress has recognized the necessity for amending the
current system, the problem of unreviewability is unlikely to be solved by
the proposals currently under consideration. H.R. 8410 fails to provide
every citizen with a uniform right to relief.' 95 Instead it would create a
weapon for harassment by singling out only certain activities for punitive
damages, The Modified District Court Plan, although creating a private
right of action, stands little chance of passage because of the overwhelm-
ing objection of district court. overload adding to delay.'
96
Suggested solutions by commentators would also entail major reor-
ganization of the structure of the federal labor system.'9 Perhaps the
most equitable and least complex solution would be an amendment to
section 10 allowing an optional private cause of action if a claim is first
dismissed by the General Counsel. The provision could be modeled on
194. See notes 142-52 and accompanying text supra.
195. See notes 172-77 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 179-93 and accompanying text supra.
197. Charles Morris proposes a Federal Labor Court to adjudicate NLRA unfair labor
practices complaints under the Railway Labor Act and title VII. The General Counsel or a
private party would initiate actions. Morris, supra note 7, at 499-509. Florian Bartosic
proposes establishment of -a Labor Court to replace the court of appeals as a forum for
review of Board decisions. He would make the General Counsel's action subject to review
to the extent that it was arbitrary or capricious. Bartosic, supra note 7, at 662-71.
the Fair Labor Standards Act' 98 or the Equal Employment Opportunities
Act'9 processes. Although private actions would increase the federal
court case load, the claims would be dispersed throughout the country.
Identical fears expressed before passage of the EEOC amendments
proved to be exaggerated. 2°° No substantive change in the body of labor
law is contemplated. No problem of res judicata in multiple suits on the
same issue would arise. It would simply provide an opportunity for every
person to have his day in court.2 '
The necessity for providing every person with an opportunity to
present his claim, quick and efficient relief, and some form of judicial
control requires congressional action. The solution should not give either
labor or management an unfair advantage, but should enable the private
and public sector to work together to achieve industrial peace.
BARBARA L. ROMBERGER
198. The Fair Labor Standards Act provides three alternatives for the charging party:
individual suit, class action, and governmental representation. See notes 139-41 and accom-
panying text supra. From the viewpoint of most practitioners this would be preferable so
that they could choose the best method to fit each situation. Costs to the taxpayer of
investigation would decrease because the burden of investigation would shift to the citizen.
It could increase the speed and efficiency of relief and repeal the unreviewable authority of
the General Counsel. Oversight Hearings on NLRA, supra note 88, at 61-62.
199. The EEOC requires dismissal of the complaint prior to individual action. See
notes 131-38 and accompanying text supra. A similar process for labor violations would give
parties an opportunity for final judicial review of a dismissed complaint.
200. See Address of John Erlenborn, supra note 6, at 223-24.
201. Id.

